Corporations and Partnerships by Hamilton, Robert W.
SMU Law Review
Volume 36




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





The survey period of 1981 witnessed a number of legislative changes
and judicial decisions affecting the law of corporations and partnerships.
While it would be an overstatement to call these changes major or funda-
mental, many of the developments are important to legal practitioners
since they affect broad areas of business practice or provide clear answers
to problems that formerly were viewed as open or uncertain.
I. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
In 1981 the Texas Legislature made a large number of changes in the
statutes relating to corporations.' The most important of these changes is
the complete revision of the close corporation statute. Many other changes
affecting routine incorporations, bylaw provisions, and corporate actions
will have an impact upon the traditional work product of the practitioner,
and every attorney should review carefully the forms currently used in
light of these recent amendments.
A. The 1981 Texas Close Corporation Statute
In 1973, following the lead of several other states, Texas enacted a spe-
cial statute 2 tailored to the perceived problems of closely held corporations
* Copyright © 1982 by Robert W. Hamilton.
B.A., Swarthmore College; J.D. University of Chicago. Benno C. Schmidt Professor
of Business Law, The University of Texas.
1. The legislative changes of significant import are discussed in this survey article. For
additional changes of general interest, see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5 (Vernon
Supp. 1982) (exemptions in the Texas Securities Act relating to the sale and issuance of
securities of mutual loan corporations, farmers' cooperative associations, and farmers' coop-
erative societies); id. art. 1302-2.09A (establishing alternative maximum interest rates for
corporations based on the bank discount auction average rate for 26-week treasury bills or
the annual or quarterly ceilings published by the Consumer Credit Commission subject to a
ceiling of 24% (28% if the borrowing is for business, commercial, investment or similar pur-
poses and exceeds $250,000)); id. art. 342-407 (deleting former requirement that directors
of state bank be shareholders); id. arts. 5069-16.01 to 5069-16.15 (adoption of systemic
plan of regulation of the sale, lease or transfer of "business opportunities," defined to in-
clude the sale or lease of products, equipment, supplies or services in excess of $500 if the
seller helps provide a location, marketing program or agrees to buy back unsold products);
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 36.15 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (establishing revised fees for
county clerks and the secretary of state for indexing names on assumed business or profes-
sional name certificates); id. § 17.42 (a "consumer," which includes corporations or partner-
ships purchasing or leasing goods or services, with assets of $25,000,000 or more may waive
in writing the protections of the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act).
2. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 545, § 18, at 1495.
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operating under the regular business corporation act. Problems of coordi-
nation with other portions of the Texas Business Corporation Act (TBCA)
arose almost immediately, however, and in 1975 the legislature completely
revised the close corporation statute.3 The failure to use the 1975 statute,
in turn, was not so much because of its impracticability but rather because
it was formidable, complex, and verbose.4 The 1981 version of the close
corporation statute is in every respect a new model. The statute repealed
the old articles 2.30-1 through 2.30-5, 5 and replaced them with a new chap-
ter in the Texas Business Corporation Act, part twelve, entitled the "Texas
Close Corporation Law.'' 6 Further, most of the complexity and verbosity
of the 1975 legislation has disappeared: articles are shorter and inter-
spersed with titled subheadings, and much of the old version's needless
spinning out of scenarios has disappeared.
In addition, the new part twelve contains provisions that should be pow-
erful inducements for attorneys to use the new Texas Close Corporation
Law on a regular basis. The principal spur in this regard may be a rela-
tively modest and buried provision, article 12.37(F)(l), 7 which attempts to
reverse by statute a substantial body of the traditional case law relating to
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil or alter ego. Under this article,
the failure of an electing close corporation "to observe usual formalities or
requirements prescribed for an ordinary corporation" shall not "be a fac-
tor in determining whether to impose personal liability on the shareholders
for the close corporation's obligations by disregarding the separate entity
of the close corporation or otherwise." 8 This appears to be broader than
the language in other statutes from which it was derived. 9 Every attorney
forming a small corporation is aware that the piercing of the corporate veil
or alter ego doctrines may lead to the imposition of personal shareholder
liability for corporate obligations. A major factor courts consider in the
3. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 134, § 6, at 308.
4. See Blunk,Analyzing Texas Articles of Incorporation: Is the Statutory Close Corpo-
ration Format Viable?, 34 Sw. L.J. 941 (1980). This study concluded that even though most
corporations formed in Texas possessed a majority of the characteristics of a close corpora-
tion, only a small fraction of eligible corporations (five percent or less) elected close corpora-
tion status. Id. at 960. Studies in other states tend to confirm this conclusion. See Karjala,
A4 Second Look at Special Close Corporation Legislation, 58 TEXAS. L. REV. 1207, 1266 n.236
(1980).
5. 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 818, § 9, at 3118.
6. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. arts. 1201-.54 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
7. Id. art. 12.37(F)(1). This section also provides that failure to follow formalities or
the requirements applicable to ordinary corporations does not invalidate a shareholders'
agreement or the status of the corporation as a close corporation. Id. art. 12.37(F)(2) & (3).
8. Id. art. 12.37(F)(1).
9. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. PROPOSED STAT. CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 17
(1980), reprinted in, 37 Bus. LAW. 269, 306 (1981), which provides that failure to follow
corporate formalities "shall not be grounds for imposing personal liability on the sharehold-
ers. . . ." The comment to this section, however, states that it "would not prevent a court
from piercing the corporate veil of a statutory close corporation if the circumstances would
justify imposing personal liability on the shareholders had the corporation not been a statu-
tory close corporation. It merely prevents a court from piercing the corporate veil because it
is a statutory close corporation." Id. at 306-07.
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imposition of such liability, though not in Texas as much as elsewhere,' 0 is
the extent to which the corporation followed corporate formalities in its
day-to-day operations. As a result, the traditional advice of cautious attor-
neys to their clients in this area is to adhere to corporate formalities. As a
practical matter, however, this advice often was not heeded as the share-
holders struggled to operate their business on a daily basis. Under the new
article 12.37(F) much of the concern about unexpected liability in this area
apparently can be eliminated simply by taking advantage of the new close
corporation election."l
Election and Termination of Close Corporation Status. The new Texas
Close Corporation Law does not impose numerical limitations on the
number of shareholders that may participate in an electing close corpora-
tion.' 2 Any corporation desiring to take advantage of part twelve may
elect close corporation status simply by placing in its articles of incorpora-
tion the following statement: "This corporation is a close corporation."'
13
The statement may also be added by amendment to the articles of an ex-
isting corporation 14 or by way of a merger or consolidation. I' Further, a
corporation that elected close corporation status under the 1975 statute is
automatically an electing close corporation under the new part twelve.'
6
The Texas Close Corporation Act also requires a conspicuous notation
on the certificate representing shares of the corporation that reads:
These shares are issued by a close corporation as defined by the
Texas Business Corporation Act. Under that Act, a shareholders'
agreement may provide for management of a close corporation by the
shareholders or in other ways different from an ordinary corporation.
10. See notes 109-47 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of recent Texas cases
involving the piercing the corporate veil doctrine.
11. Some doubt always exists about the efficacy of a general statute such as art.
12.37(F)(1) in the light of the numerous contexts in which courts apply the piercing the
corporate veil doctrine. Even if this article is construed narrowly rather than broadly, how-
ever, it should give some protection against the imposition of liability for corporate obliga-
tions on individual shareholders, an area that is now clouded with uncertainty. See 19 R.
HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, § 234 (Texas Practice 1973).
In his description of article 12.37(F) upon its proposal by the Texas Bar Association, Pro-
fessor Lebowitz wrote that the failure to adhere to normal corporate norms "should not be
regarded as factors per se to warrant disregard of the corporate entity .... . Lebowitz,
Texas Close Corporation Law, 44 TEx. B.J. 51, 54 (1981) (emphasis added). If anything, this
description lessens the protection of article 12.37(F) against personal liability for corporate
obligations and realigns it with the statutory antecedents of the statute discussed in note 9
supra.
12. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 12.01-.54 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
13. Id. art. 12.11.
14. Id. art. 12.13(A). Such an amendment must be approved by all the shareholders
whether or not otherwise entitled to vote.
15. Id. art. 12.13(B). Such a merger must be approved by all the shareholders of both
the surviving and disappearing corporations whether or not otherwise entitled to vote.
16. Id. art. 12.14. All provisions in the articles of incorporation of such a corporation
that were required under the old close corporation statute remain valid and enforceable so
long as its close corporate election is retained under the new statute. Id. A shareholders'
agreement under the old statute is also treated as a shareholders' agreement under articles
12.32-12.37 of the new act.
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This may subject the holder of this certificate to certain obligations
and liabilities not otherwise imposed on shareholders of an ordinary
corporation. On any sale or transfer of these shares, the transferor is
obligated to deliver to the transferee a complete copy of any share-
holders' agreement. 17
The omission of this statement, however, does not affect the validity of the
close corporation election.' 8
The termination of a close corporation election is somewhat more com-
plex than the original election, principally because the terminating corpo-
ration must restore itself to the status of an ordinary corporation.19 If the
corporation has operated without a board, one must be selected in the
manner specified in either the statute or the operative shareholders' agree-
ment.20 These provisions are drafted clearly, and provide a sensible proce-
dure by which a close corporation may return to the status of an ordinary
corporation. 2'
Privileges Resulting From the Election of Close Corporation Status. The
basic privilege that a close corporation election provides is the corpora-
tion's ability to operate under a shareholders' agreement with essentially as
much freedom as a partnership but without the concern of personal or
unlimited liability. The shareholders' agreement may cover any one or
more of an elaborate list of topics, including dispensation with a board of
directors, the imposition of any type of restrictions on transfer of shares or
the restriction of the right to participate in management by transferees, and
the right of dissolution by one or more shareholders upon the occurrence
of a specified event or contingency.22 The validity of this agreement is in
no way dependent upon its conformity with traditional corporate norms.23
The Shareholder Agreement The shareholder's agreement is the basic
close corporation document. It must be executed by every voting and non-
17. Id. art. 12.39(A).
18. Id. art. 12.39(B).
19. Termination may be effected by deletion of the "magic" close corporation election
statement from the articles or by filing a "statement of termination" with the secretary of
state. Id. art. 12.21(A). The draftsmen apparently contemplate that the latter method will
normally be followed, since article 12.22 contains elaborate provisions for the contents of the
statement, its filing, the effect of the filing, and for notifying shareholders that the statement
of termination has been filed. Id. art. 12.22(B)-(E).
Consistent with the general approach of the chapter, article 12.37(F)(3) provides that the
failure to follow corporate formalities or the traditional rules applicable to ordinary corpora-
tions does not affect the validity or continuation of a close corporation election.
20. Id. art 12.23(C), (D).
21. Interim directors named in the shareholders' agreement may manage the business,
id. art. 12.23(C)(1), or if none are named, the shareholders may manage the business in the
interim. Id. art. 12.23(E). Permanent directors are to be elected at a shareholders' meeting,
however, which may be called by any single shareholder if such a meeting is not held within
30 days after the termination became effective. Id. art. 12.23(D). The number of directors
to be elected may be specified in the articles or bylaws, or if not, the number is three and
they shall serve until the next annual shareholders' meeting. Id. art. 12.23(D)-(E).
22. Id. art. 12.32(A).
23. Id. art. 12.37(F)(2).
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voting shareholder of an existing corporation that is electing close corpora-
tion status and by every person who has subscribed for the shares of or is
to become a shareholder of a new close corporation. 24 Copies of this basic
document must be made available to all persons bound by the agreement
and to every person issued a certificate representing shares. 25 The agree-
ment, however, need not be made a matter of public record. The statute
contemplates only the filing with the secretary of state of a document enti-
tled, "Statement of Operation as a Close Corporation," which recites that
the close corporation "is being operated and its business and affairs are
being conducted under the terms of a shareholders agreement made pursu-
ant to the Texas Close Corporation Law" and specifying when the date of
operation began.26 This filing makes the corporation's operation as a close
corporation a matter of public record, but the failure to file it does not
apparently affect the validity of the agreement or the status of the
corporation. 27
The Texas Close Corporation Law makes it clear that a transferee, do-
nee, purchaser, or legatee takes shares subject to the terms of the share-
holders' agreement "for all purposes" regardless of whether such
transferee had knowledge of the existence of the agreement. 28 While a
transferor is required by statute to provide a transferee with a copy of the
agreement, 29 the validity or enforceability of the agreement and the inter-
est of the transferee in the shares are not affected by a failure to do so.30
Such a transferee is entitled only to the rather bitter right to obtain a copy
of the agreement to which he is unknowingly subject.31 Conversely, a per-
son who disposes of his shares generally is not subject thereafter to the
restrictions of the agreement.32 This provision, of course, does not apply
to dispositions that are themselves violations of the agreement and does
not relieve a person of liability for predisposition breaches.
A shareholders' agreement may be modified only by the written consent
of all voting and nonvoting shareholders or subscribers33 and is terminated
when the close corporation election is terminated.34 The agreement, how-
ever, may provide that it remains in effect as an ordinary shareholders'
agreement. 35
24. Id. art. 12.33(A). The shareholders' agreement may serve as combination subscrip-
tion agreement, agreement to become a shareholder, and governing document for the
corporation.
25. Id. art. 12.33(C).
26. Id. art. 12.34(B).
27. Id. art. 12.34(D).
28. Id. art. 12.36(A).
29. Id. art. 12.36(B).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. art. 12.36(D).
33. Id. art. 12.33(B).
34. Id. art. 12.36(E).
35. Id. Presumably this exception means that the agreement is subject to the limitations
on pooling agreement pursuant to the Texas Business Corporation Act. See id art. 2.30(B)
(Vernon 1980).
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The Role of Shareholders in the Electing Close Corporation. If the share-
holders' agreement dispenses with the board of directors, the shareholders
are deemed to be directors for purposes of most other provisions of the
close corporation act. 36 This includes liability for managerial acts or omis-
sions, and may include liability for acts taken by third persons empowered
with management authority by the shareholders' agreement, apparently on
the theory that the shareholdrs should accept responsibility for their failure
to oversee the conduct of those third persons.37 A shareholder is not liable,
however, unless he had the right to vote or to consent to the action taken,38
and he is also insulated from liability if he dissents from the action taken.39
Shareholders may take director-type actions by a majority vote without
a meeting if authorized by the shareholder agreement, and they may also
take informal action by unanimous consent without a meeting and without
a written consent if the action is taken with "the full knowledge of the
action by all the shareholders of the close corporation and their failure to
object to the action in a timely manner. '40 This article appears to be
drafted rather narrowly, however, and some actions, if not taken by unani-
mous consent, may require a formal meeting and approval by a majority
of all outstanding shares4' in contrast to the traditional requirement of a
majority of the shares voting at a meeting at which a quorum is present.4 2
Whether such a result is desirable is questionable, but in any event the
impact of the statute may be changed by appropriate provisions in the
shareholders' agreement.
Judicial Proceedings Relating to Close Corporations. The Texas Close Cor-
poration Law contains provisions specifically authorizing three types of ju-
dicial proceedings: (1) enforcement of a close corporation provision,
36. Id. art. 12.37(A). An exception is expressly made in the director removal provisions
of id. art. 2.30(B) (Vernon 1980).
37. Id. art. 12.37(C).
38. Id. art. 12.37(E).
39. Id. A dissent may "be proven by" (1) an entry in the minutes, (2) a written dissent
filed with the person acting as secretary of the meeting before it is adjourned, (3) a written
dissent sent by registered mail to the secretary of the corporation, or (4) "any other means
reasonably evidencing the dissent." Id. This provision constitutes a relaxation and revision
of the law applicable to regular corporations under the TBCA; see id. art. 2.41(B) (Vernon
1980). Because there is no logical reason to have different methods of recording dissents for
electing and nonelecting corporations, it would appear that ultimately this more general
article should be amended to conform to Article 12.37(E).
40. Id. art. 12.37(D).
41. The first sentence of article 12.37(D) refers to (1) actions "that this Act requires or
permits to be taken by the board of directors of an ordinary corporation," which shall or
may be taken at a shareholders' meeting or (2) actions taken "in the manner permitted by a
shareholders' agreement, this article, or this Act, without a meeting." The second sentence
provides that "[u]nless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation of the close corpo-
ration or a shareholders' agreement," such action is binding if taken (1) by a majority of all
the outstanding voting shares, or (2) by formal or informal unanimous consent. Id.
In order to avoid possible uncertainty as to the application of this section in various situa-
tions, it would be desirable to include a complete code of operating procedures in the share-
holders' agreement. Code provisions might provide for mandatory consultation and a
shareholders' meeting if any objection from a shareholder cannot be resolved amicably.
42. Id. art. 2.28 (Vernon 1980).
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(2) appointment of a provisional director, and (3) appointment of a custo-
dian.43 This listing of judicial remedies is not exclusive, however, and
therefore does not foreclose institution of other types of litigation. 44
(a) Preconditions to Suit. Generally a shareholder must exhaust reme-
dies under the close corporation agreement before he may resort to any
judicial remedy. 45 Arbitration is specifically referred to as an example of a
nonjudicial remedy.46 Further, a shareholder may not commence a pro-
ceeding for damages or monetary relief if he has an appraisal remedy
under the shareholders' agreement or under other statutory provisions. 47
This provision, however, does not seek to exclude equitable or other relief
because of the appraisal remedy.48 The general requirement of exhaustion
of remedies is not applicable if the shareholder "proves that the close cor-
poration, the shareholders as a whole, or the shareholder will suffer irrepa-
rable harm before the nonjudicial remedy is exhausted. '49
(b) Proceedings to Enforce Close Corporation Provisions. Article 12.52
authorizes a court of "competent jurisdiction," 50 to enforce specifically a
close corporation provision "without regard to whether or not there is an
adequate remedy at law," in a manner the court determines to be "fair and
equitable." 51 The statute then adds a list of nonexclusive possible reme-
dies, including damages rather than specific performance,52 appointment
of a provisional director or custodian,53 appointment of a receiver for spe-
cific assets54 or to rehabilitate the corporation, 55 involuntary dissolution, or
termination of the close corporation status.56 In general terms, the reme-
dies of liquidation, involuntary dissolution, and receivership are available
only if the court determines that all other remedies are "inadequate. '57
(c) Provisional Directors. A provisional director may be appointed for a
close corporation if the directors or persons authorized to manage the busi-
ness are in such discord respecting the management of the corporation's
43. Id. art. 12.51(B).
44. Id. art. 12.51(D).
45. Id. art. 12.5 1(E).
46. Id.
47. Id See arts. 5.11-5.13 (Vernon 1980).
48. Id. art. 12.51(E).
49. Id. This simple test gives courts ample freedom to consider what kinds of injury are
"irreparable" because no further explanation of the term is provided.
50. Id. art. 12.5 1(A)(1). A court of "competent jurisdiction" refers to a district court in
the county in which the close corporation has its principal office.
51. Id. art. 12.52(A).
52. Id. art. 12.52(A)(1).
53. Id. art. 12.52(A)(2).
54. Id. art. 12.52(A)(3). This article must comply with id. art. 7.04 (Vernon 1980).
55. Id. art. 12.52(A)(4).
56. Id. art. 12.52(A)(6). The statute mandates that termination is not to be decreed
except in the most dire circumstances. The court must first determine that all other remedies
are inadequate, and that factors relating to the size, busines, and shareholder relationships of
the corporation "make it wholly impractical to continue close corporation status." Id.
57. Id. art. 12.52(B).
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affairs that the inability to obtain the votes or consent required for corpo-
rate action precludes handling of the close corporation's affairs to the gen-
eral advantage of the shareholders.5 8 If the shareholders' agreement
dispenses with the board and vests management in the shareholders, a
"provisional director" may be appointed to vote as a shareholder in con-
nection with the management of the business. 59
A provisional director must be an "impartial person" who has had no
prior formal connection with the corporation, as shareholder, party to a
shareholders' agreement, manager or creditor.60 He or she has all the
rights and powers of a director or manager pursuant to a shareholders'
agreement 6' and is entitled to compensation for services rendered. 62 The
amount may be set by agreement with the corporation with court approval,
or by the court alone if agreement cannot be reached. 63 A provisional
director may be removed by a vote of a majority of the regular directors or
the shareholders or such other percentage as may be necessary to take ac-
tion under the shareholders' agreement.64 The theory of the provision is
that director or shareholder agreement to act on his or her removal obvi-
ates any need for the provisional director.
(d) Custodians. A custodian for a close corporation must have essen-
tially the same qualifications as a receiver appointed under other provi-
sions of the TBCA,65 and has essentially the same duties and
responsibilities except that his objective is to continue the business of the
corporation rather than to liquidate it.66 A custodian may be appointed
for a close corporation in three situations: (1) the shareholders are so di-
vided that they have failed to elect successors to directors whose terms
have expired; (2) the business of the corporation is suffering or is
threatened with "irreparable injury" because the directors, shareholders,
or persons with authority to manage the business under a shareholders'
agreement are so divided that action cannot be taken, and other deadlock
remedies have failed, or (3) the plaintiff has the right to dissolve the close
corporation under a shareholders' agreement. 67
58. Id. art. 12.53(A).
59. Id. art. 12.53(B)(2).
60. Id. art. 12.53(B)(1).
61. Id. art. 12.53(B)(2). Such rights include a right to notice of, and power to vote at
meetings of directors or shareholders. Id.
62. Id. art. 12.53(B)(4).
63. Id.
64. Id. art. 12.53(B)(3).
65. Id. art. 12.54(B). The qualifications, powers, and duties of a receiver are set forth in
id. arts. 7.05-7.07. These articles are made expressly applicable to custodians by art.
12.54(B).
66. Id. art. 12.54(B). The appointment of a custodian specifically to carry out a dissolu-
tion pursuant to an express power to dissolve in a shareholders' agreement clearly is the
exception to the continuation objective. Id.
67. Id. art. 12.54(A).
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B. Protection of Greater Voting Requirementsfor Shareholders
Article 9.08(A) of the TBCA has long permitted the articles of incorpo-
ration to increase the number of shares needed to approve a corporate ac-
tion by shareholders up to and including unanimity.68 In 1981 this article
was amended to require that any amendment or modification of such a
supermajority provision be approved by the vote required by the provision
itself.69 In effect, this new section prevents the removal of a supermajority
requirement contained in the articles of incorporation by the simple two-
thirds vote generally required for amendments to the articles. 70 This pro-
vision apparently was designed to protect a minority shareholder's veto
power in a close corporation. The article also may encourage the use of a
supermajority requirement in publicly held corporations as a device to
thwart hostile takeovers.
C Correction of Filings with the Secretary of State
In 1981, a new part seven 7' was added to the Texas Miscellaneous Cor-
poration Laws Act 72 to permit "corrections" in documents filed with the
secretary of state. A "correction" may be made (1) if the instrument filed
is an inaccurate record of the corporate action referred to in the instru-
ment, (2) if the instrument contains "an inaccurate or erroneous state-
ment," or (3) if the instrument "was defectively or erroneously executed,
sealed, acknowledged, or verified."'7 3 A correction is made by filing a sim-
ple "Articles of Correction" form 74 and paying the filing fee of ten dol-
lars. 75 The secretary of state's subsequent issuance of a "Certificate of
Correction" follows the traditional pattern of handling corporate docu-
ments in Texas. 76
In practice, the correction of filed documents may turn out to be a slip-
pery business because the provision is not limited to mechanical or factual
errors at the time the document was filed, but apparently may include cor-
rections necessitated by subsequent events. Article 1302-7.04 attempts to
deal with such problems by stating that although the instrument as cor-
rected is considered to have been filed on the date the original instrument
was filed, "as to persons who are adversely affected by the correction, the
instrument as corrected is considered to have been filed on the date the
articles of correction were filed."'77 While a need may exist for a mecha-
nism to obviate the formal amendment process in correcting clerical or
other inadvertant errors on documents filed with the secretary of state,
68. Id. art. 9.08(A) (Vernon 1980).
69. Id. art. 9.08(B) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
70. Id. art. 4.02 (Vernon 1980).
71. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 1302-7.01 to 1302-7.05 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
72. Id. art. 1302-1.01 to 1302-7.05.
73. Id. art. 1302-7.01.
74. Id. art. 1302-7.03.
75. Id. art. 1302-7.05.
76. Id. art. 1302-7.03.
77. Id. art. 1302-7.04(B).
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only time will tell whether this new chapter creates more problems than it
solves.
D. Amendments of Articles and Other Corporate Actions Before Shares
are Issued
Before shares are issued, the initial board of directors may approve nec-
essary amendments to the articles of incorporation by its own majority
vote.78 A minor amendment to article 4.04 of the TBCA provides that the
secretary of state may accept articles of amendment in this situation if exe-
cuted and verified by a majority of the directors. 79
E. Combination of Offices of President and Secretary
Persons forming one-person corporations in Texas have long questioned
the logic behind article 2.42 of the TBCA that required the offices of presi-
dent and secretary to be held by different persons. In effect, this provision
required one incorporated proprietor to have a financially disinterested
outsider serve as an officer of the corporation. This requirement was elim-
inated in 1981 so that now "[a]ny two (2) or more offices may be held by
the same person."'80
F Corporate Purposes
Part four of the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act, 81 a set of
anachronistic provisions relating to the acquisition and ownership of land
by business corporations, was finally repealed in 1981.82 For many years
this part had virtually no substantive impact but served primarily as a trap
for unwary or newly admitted attorneys who included a reference to the
acquisition of real estate in the articles of incorporation but failed to add
the magic phrase, "Subject to Part Four of the Texas Miscellaneous Cor-
poration Laws Act."'83
Another minor change was made in 1981 in article 2.01, a corporate
purpose provision that also authorizes certain natural resource corpora-
tions to exercise the power of eminent domain under the Natural Re-
sources Code.84 The amendment extended the power of eminent domain
to a corporation or groups of corporations acting in partnership or in com-
78. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 4.02(A)(1) (Vernon 1980).
79. Id. art. 4.04(A) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
80. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.42(A) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
81. 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 205, § 1, at 408.
82. 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 297, § 34, at 848.
83. This requirement was stripped of all meaning when the TBCA was amended in
1973 to permit a corporate purpose to engage in any lawful business. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 3.02 (Vernon 1980). Indeed, this author is advised that references to real estate in
articles of incorporation had become so infrequent in recent years that the secretary of state
had stopped rejecting articles of incorporation for failing to include the "magic phrase"
referred to in the text.
84. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.01(B)(3)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982) incorporating
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 111.019-.022 (Vernon 1978). The double nature of this arti-
cle is discussed in R. HAMILTON, supra note 11, at § 355.
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bination with other corporations and also to corporations engaged in the
transportation of carbon dioxide as well as other minerals.85
G Foreign Corporations
A number of technical amendments to the filing requirements applicable
to profit and nonprofit foreign corporations were made in 1981.86 These
amendments not only brought the provisions relating to foreign nonprofit
corporations into line with correlative principles applicable to corporations
for profit, but also made many technical changes in the TBCA. These
changes are not of a type that need to be described in detail in an annual
survey. Attorneys representing foreign corporations will find it important
to review this legislation, and to make the necessary technical changes to
assure that future filings are consistent with the new requirements.
H Nonpayment of Filing Fees or Initial Franchise Tax Deposits
Apparently in order to combat "hot checks" received by the secretary of
state for filing fees or franchise tax deposits, the Texas statutes were
amended in 1981 to permit involuntary dissolution of domestic corpora-
tions, revocation of certificates of authority of foreign corporations, or rev-
ocation of the filing of any document, if the filing fee was not paid or "was
paid by an instrument that was dishonored when presented by the state for
payment. '87 Notice of a dishonored check and subsequent dissolution or
revocation may be given by regular mail.88
I Acknowledgments
In a stride toward simplicity, the 1981 legislature authorized a short
form of acknowledgment for individuals, corporations, partners, and vari-
ous types of representatives.8 9 The form basically requires only the state-
ment, "This instrument was acknowledged before me on [date] by [name
or names of person or persons acknowledging]" folowed by a simple nota-
rial execution.90 The term "was acknowledged" in this form is statutorily
defined to include personal appearance before the notarial official and ac-
knowledgment that he or she executed the document "for the purposes and
consideration expressed in the instrument." 9'
85. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.01(3)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
86. TE x. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-4.06 to 1396-9.03 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
87. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.01(B)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (involuntary disso-
lution); id. art. 8.16(B) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (revocation of certificate of authority of foreign
corporation); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3916B (Vernon Supp. 1982).
88. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 7.01C(2), 8.16C(2). The failure to give this notice
does not affect the validity of the dissolution or revocation. Id.
89. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6607a, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). The statute does
not pertain to corporate documents that have to be verified.
90. Id.




A. Post-Dissolution Product Liability Claims
Products liability claims against dissolved corporations now present ma-
jor problems under Texas law; these problems have only just arisen but
will ultimately have to be addressed by the legislature or again by the
Texas Supreme Court.
The classic products liability case was presented by the facts of Fort
Worth Capital Corp. v. Hunter.92 In 1960 Hunter-Hayes installed an eleva-
tor in a building then under construction in Fort Worth. In 1975 Moeller,
an employee of an elevator repair company, was seriously injured when
the elevator fell on him as a result of the alleged negligence of Hunter-
Hayes in installing and maintaining the elevator years earlier. Moeller
sued the former shareholders of Hunter-Hayes on a product liability
claim 93 because Hunter-Hayes was no longer in existence, having sold its
assets to Dover Corpo, ration for 25,000 shares of Dover Corporation stock,
distributed these shares to its shareholders, and dissolved, receiving a cer-
tificate of dissolution from the secretary of state on March 11, 1964.
The plaintiff in this situation traditionally has had two choices: First, he
may proceed against the successor corporation, the purchaser of the origi-
nal corporation's assets, under the "de facto merger" doctrine, 94 or sec-
ondly, he may sue the former shareholders of the original corporation
under the "trust fund" doctrine. 95 These doctrines proceed on entirely dif-
ferent theories, but often are available alternatives to the injured plaintiff.
The de facto merger doctrine assumes that the successor corporation con-
tinued the business of the original corporation much as before, and that
the transaction had been cast in the form of a sale of assets without as-
sumption of liabilities rather than a merger in order to avoid contingent or
unknown liabilities, exactly the kind of liability raised by Moeller's injury.
Numerous courts from various jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in
similar situations. 96 The trust fund theory, on the other hand, addresses
the inherent unfairness of allowing the shareholders to receive the assets
on dissolution undiminished by applicable liabilities. Unlike the de facto
merger doctrine, the trust fund theory leads to liability of the shareholders
who received the assets on dissolution. 97
92. 620 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1981).
93. Moeller actually sued multiple defendants including his employer and the building
owner. Cross actions were filed by these other defendants against the shareholder of
Hunter-Hayes. 1d. at 548.
94. See cases cited at note 96 infra.
95. See cases cited at note 97 infra.
96. See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Gee v. Tenneco, 615 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1980); Ramirez v. Am-
sted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981); Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J.
361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574
(1977); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). For a case
refusing to apply the de facto merger doctrine in this situation, see Armour-Dial, Inc. v.
Alkar Eng'r Corp., 469 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
97. See, e.g., Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, 147 Tex. 608, 218 S.W.2d 451 (1949).
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Both of these doctrines now appear to be foreclosed in Texas. The result
apparently is that plaintiffs are artificially barred from recovering anything
from anyone on product liability claims following dissolution. In addition,
unless the present rules are changed, corporations in the future may con-
ceivably take regular "dissolution baths" to shed themselves of unknown
and unwanted contingent product liability claims without a significant
change in ownership.
Closing the "De Facto Merger" Door. The first Texas case recognizing the
de facto merger doctrine arose in 1975.98 A purchaser of the assets of an
insurance company was held liable on a claim of fraud arising from apre-
sale, pre-dissolution transaction by the insurance company even though
the purchase agreement expressly disclaimed any intention to assume lia-
bilities. The defendant vigorously argued that the plaintiffs remedy
should be against the former shareholders under article 7.12 of the
TBCA. 99 This argument was rejected by the court on the theory that the
transaction was "tantamount" to a merger since the purchaser paid for the
insurance company assets with its own stock, and that the plaintiffs' rem-
edy against the selling shareholders under article 7.12 was "cumulative of
other remedies.. . not an exclusive remedy." 1' °
In the 1979 legislative session the legislature shut the de facto merger
door tightly by the enactment of the following provision to the "sale of
assets" article of the TBCA:
B. A disposition of all, or substantially all, of the property and
assets of a corporation requiring the special authorization of the
shareholders of the corporation under Section A of this article:
(1) is not considered to be a merger or consolidation pursuant
to the Act or otherwise; and
(2) except as otherwise expressly provided by another statute,
does not make the acquiring corporation responsible or liable for any
liability or obligation of the selling corporation the acquiring corpora-
tion did not expressly assume.'01
The Bar Committee comment explicitly states that the purpose of this
amendment was the preclusion of the de facto merger doctrine in situa-
tions involving the transfer of all or substantially all of one corporation's
assets to another entity. 0 2
Federal courts also have recognized a trust fund concept. See, e.g., Pierce v. United States,
255 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1921) (government had right to pursue unsatisfied claims against dis-
solved corporation); Unites States v. Thomas, 515 F. Supp. 1351 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (share-
holder of dissolved hospital personally liable to refund medicare overpayment because he
received hospital assets on distribution; no reference to state law).
98. Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
99. The statute, unchanged since 1955, is found at TEx. Bus. Cokp. Acr ANN. art. 7.12(Vernon 1980).
100. 553 S.W.2d at 787.
101. Tax. Bus. Copp. AcT ANi,. art. 5.10(B) (Vernon 1980).
102. The 1979 amendment added Article 5.10(B), the purpose of which is to pre-
clude the application of the doctrine of defacto merger in any sale, lease,
1982]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Closing the "Trust Fund" Door. Enactment of the prohibition against the
de facto merger doctrine provoked little controversy in 1979. The issue
was not well publicized, and the availability of a suit against the share-
holders of the dissolved corporation appeared to provide an adequate al-
ternative remedy. Apparently no one considered the potential problem of
a claim arising after dissolution of the corporation and dissipation of its
assets. A suit against the former shareholders seems more rational than a
suit against the purchaser. The court need not ignore a clear provision of a
contract negotiated at arms' length, but instead can impose liability on the
persons benefiting from the original commercial conduct from which the
liability arose.
In Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., however, the Texas Supreme
Court construed the dissolution statute apparently so as to close down any
possibility of a suit premised on the trust fund theory. 0 3 Article 7.12,
closely following section 105 of the Model Business Corporation Act,' °4
provides:
[The dissolution of a corporation] shall not take away or impair any
remedy available to or against such corporation, its officers, directors,
or shareholders, for any right or claim existing, or any liability in-
curred, prior to such dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon
is commenced within three years after the date of such dissolution. 0 5
Even though the statutory language seems on its face to relate only to
claims arising prior to dissolution and not to post-dissolution claims the
court read article 7.12 to exclude all post-dissolution claims:
[Earlier Texas statutes] supplant the equitable trust fund theory by
declaring a statutory equivalent. In Texas, recognition of the trust
fund theory, as applied to dissolved corporations, did not exist apart
from these statutes.
We find no indication that the legislature intended for Article 7.12
to be interpreted any differently. Because the statute applies to of-
ficers, directors, and shareholders of a dissolved corporation, it em-
bodies the trust fund doctrine but only to the extent that the doctrine
exchange or other disposition of all or substantially all the property and assets
of a corporation requiring authorization under Article 5.1 0(A). Under the de
facto merger doctrine, as announced in Western Resources Life Insurance Co.
v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783 . . . an acquiring corporation can be held re-
sponsible for al liabilities of a selling corporation notwithstanding the absence
of a contractual agreement to assume such liabilities or even if such assump-
tion is contractually negated. The new statutory provision provides that the
acquiring corporation in a purchase of assets transaction does not assume or
otherwise become liable for liabilities of the corporation whose assets are
purchased, unless the acquiring corporation agrees contractually to assume or
become liable for such liabilities. However, by expressly excepting from the
operation of section B the effect of "any other statute of this State," the statu-
tory liabilities of an acqiring corporation under the bulk sales or fraudulent
conveyances laws or similar statutes are left intact.
TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10(A) & (B), comment (Vernon 1980).
103. 620 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1981).
104. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 105 (1979).
105. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7-12(A) (Vernon 1980).
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allows recovery for pre-dissolution claims. Therefore, Article 7.12 ex-
presses a legislative policy to restrict the use of the trust fund theory to
pre-dissolution claims, and to protect shareholders, officers and direc-
tors of a dissolved corporation from prolonged and uncertain liability.
See Bishop v. Schield Bantam C., 193 F. Supp. 94, 95 (N.D. Iowa
1968); Norton, [30 Bus. Law] at 1077.
Even if the trust fund theory did exist outside of these remedial
statutes, we must assume that when the legislature enacted Article
7.12 it knew to what extent the equitable doctrine already provided a
remedy for pre-dissolution claims. [citations omitted] With this in
mind, no real purpose would be served by the enactment of Article
7.12, permitting suits against officers, directors, and shareholders of a
dissolved corporation, unless the legislature intended for the statute to
bar resort to the trust fund theory apart from the statute in order to
enforce post-dissolution claims. To hold otherwise would violate the
rule of statutory construction that the legislature is never presumed to
do a useless act. [citations omitted] Accordingly, we hold Article 7.12
bars resort to the trust fund theory as it exists apart from the
statute. 106
This mechanical analysis of the Texas statute effectively leaves remedi-
less all plaintiffs in products liability cases arising from accidents occurring
after the dissolution of the corporation. In addition, corporations conceiv-
ably could take regular "dissolution baths" to shed themselves of unknown
and unwanted contingent product liability claims without a significant
change in ownership. While some case law exists in other jurisdictions
accepting this general construction, 10 7 apparently none of these states has
abolished the de facto merger doctrine by legislative enactment. Also, the
court's interpretation of legislative intent is artificial because the language
being construed was adopted in 1955, while Texas did not recognize prod-
ucts liability claims of the type presented by Moeller until 1967.108 Fur-
ther, the court apparently was unaware that it was largely emasculating the
alternative remedy that had made the earlier legislative decision to elimi-
nate the de facto merger doctrine a rational approach. A large class of
plaintiffs are now left without legal recourse; a result that I am confident
that neither the Texas legislature nor the Texas Supreme Court intended.
The problem so created seems suitable for being addressed either by the
court or by the legislature in the future.
B. Piercing the Corporate Veil
While Texas courts deal yearly with significant numbers of cases which
advance the doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil," they do not appear
to struggle with the conceptual problems to the same extent as courts in
106. 620 S.W.2d at 550-51.
107. See generally Norton, Relationshi of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors Upon Dis-
solution. Nature and Implications of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of Corporate Assets, 30 Bus.
LAW 1061 (1975). For application of the trust fund concept in Texas see Wortham v. Lach-
man-Rose Co., 440 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, no writ).
108. See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
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many states. Perhaps this is due to a helpful series of opinions of the Texas
Supreme Court' 09 that tend to discount rhetoric and encourage concentra-
tion on the significant economic factors governing the application of this
ubiquitous doctrine.
In Torregrossa v. Szelc the Texas Supreme Court refused to pierce the
corporate veil to hold the corporate vice president (who was also a fifty
percent shareholder) liable in a contract case for breach of warranty de-
spite (1) a failure to follow corporate formalities and (2) nominal original
capitalization of $1,000 in a business that obviously had a substantial cash
flow and a substantial need for capital.1 0 The court pointed out that the
sales lot at which the used automobile was purchased was identified by a
sign showing that it was operated by the corporation and that all sales
documents were exclusively in the name of the corporation."' Further,
the corporation maintained its own bank account. Although the vice presi-
dent apparently was in a position of some authority and occupied an office
on the business premises, the court stated that neither factor indicated that
he personally was the owner of the business."l 2 The court's refusal to
pierce the corporate veil on these facts was correct. So far as the failure to
hold shareholders' or directors' meetings was concerned, the court noted
that "[ilt is apparent that with but two shareholders, the corporate meet-
ings would be very informal"; 1 3 thus, no personal liability should be im-
posed as this lack of formality was not shown to have hurt anyone.'14 In
addressing the minimum capital issue, the court distinguished other cases
relying on inadequate capitalization" 1 5 as a basis for piercing the corporate
veil. In those cases the inadequate capitalization was part of a "fraudulent
scheme on the part of a major stockholder to acquire virtually all of the
corporate assets to repay advances he had made." Such transactions,
which injured creditors, constituted the "manipulation of the corporate
form of business organization to serve the major stockholder's personal
interest."" 16 This decision should be applauded. It is logical, conceptually
sound, and appears to reach the proper result on the facts.
109. The leading case involving the "piercing the corporate veil" doctrine is Bell Oil &
Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1968). See also Sagebrush Sales Co.
v. Strauss, 605 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1980); Torregrossa v. Szelc, 603 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1980);
Foladori, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Corporations and Parnershops, 35 Sw. L.J. 225, 230-
31(1981).
110. 603 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1980).
111. Id. at 804.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Consistent with this analysis are Preston Farm & Ranch Supply, Inc. v. Biozyme
Enterprises, 615 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ); and Urban v. First
State Bank, 609 S.W.2d 857, (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ). But see United States
v. Thomas, 515 F. Supp. 1351 (W.D. Tex. 1981), where, as an alternative ground of decision,
the court pierced the corporate veil because of a failure to follow corporate formalities even
though no one was injured by the lack of formality. It is regrettable that such unsound
holdings continue to recur in this area.
115. See, e.g., Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ refd
n.r.e.).
116. 603 S.W.2d at 805.
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In the second case, Sagebrush Sales Co. v. Strauss,1 17 the Texas Supreme
Court and the court of civil appeals in Texarkana' 18 disagreed sharply on
the reasonable business inferences to be drawn from a very common fac-
tual pattern. A builder sought to establish a line of credit with a wholesale
lumber dealer in order to build apartment houses. Apparently the precise
nature of the legal entity to build the apartments--corporation, individual,
or partnership-was never made clear. At the lumber dealer's request, a
detailed financial statement was submitted in the name of "Richard C.
Strauss, d/b/a/ Crawford Strauss Properties Co." This was clearly a per-
sonal financial statement of the individual, Robert C. Strauss.1 9 After the
line of credit was approved in the name of "Crawford-Strauss," numerous
purchases were made and paid for by checks drawn on a variety of
"Strauss Investment" accounts. Purchase orders were uniformly made on
the letterhead showing the purchaser to be "Crawford-Strauss Properties,
Inc.' 20 and signed by an employee as "purchasing agent." The Texar-
kana court ordered a take-nothing judgment be entered in favor of Strauss
personally on the theory that the plaintiff should have obtained a financial
statement of the corporation and a personal guaranty of the corporate debt
by Strauss if it wished to hold Strauss individually.1 2 1 The Supreme Court
reversed, stating that personal liability should be imposed "only in ex-
traordinary circumstances," 22 but that jury conclusions imposing liability
on these facts were justified. 123 The court stated that the letterhead "Craw-
ford-Strauss Properties, Inc." and the use of a "purchasing agent" were not
sufficient to charge the plaintiff, as a matter of law, with knowledge that it
was contracting with a corporation.124
On the facts set forth, the conclusion by the Texas Supreme Court not
only seems reasonable but also quite plausible. The corporate form does
lend itself to the abuse of being "slid in" to a transaction after the other
party is led to believe it is dealing with an individual. In such circum-
stances, a persuasive argument can be made for "piercing the corporate
veil."125 These facts seem to present a good example of this problem.
On remand the Texarkana court of appeals remanded back to the trial
court for further factual findings but restated its view of the facts that the
plaintiff had not followed "good business practice"' 26 in the transaction.
The Texarkana court assumed that the plaintiff knew or should have
known it was dealing with a corporation from the outset. If this were true,
117. 605 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1980).
118. 598 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980), rev'd 605 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1980),
opinion on remand, 609 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980).
119. It showed, for example, undistributed profits due to Strauss from a law firm of
which he was a member.
120. 605 S.W.2d at 860 (emphasis added).
121. 598 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980), rev'd, 605 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1980).
122. 605 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. 1980).
123. Id. at 860-61.
124. Id. at 860.
125. See, e.g., Anderson v. Smith, 398 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, no
writ.), for another example of this stratagem.
126. 609 S.W.2d at 837.
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it would indeed be "good business practice" to obtain a financial statement
of the corporation and to obtain a written guaranty by the shareholder if
one expects to hold him responsible for the corporate obligations. If one
starts with the assumption that the lumber dealer reasonably believed he
was dealing with an individual from the outset, however, its conduct seems
completely rational. For example, one who is relying on an individual
obligor would not ask him to guaranty his own debt. Thus, the disagree-
ment comes down to whether the lumber dealer should have realized a
corporation was being "slid into" the negotiation.
In City of El Paso v. Del Norte Golfa27 the court refused to hold the
directors of a country club personally liable for breach of a lease agree-
ment even though there was "almost total disregard for corporate formali-
ties,' 28 and a "very loosely run corporation [with] very poor
bookkeeping."'' 29 Consistent with the Texas Supreme Court cases dis-
cussed above, the El Paso court held that such failure did not amount to
the corporation being a sham, and that because the jury had concluded
that the directors did not act with a fraudulent intent, no personal liability
should be imposed.130
Two cases arising during the survey period involved the piercing the
corporate veil doctrine in the context of promises or statements by officers
that could be interpreted as personal assumption of the obligation of the
corporation. In Keith v. Woodul '3 1 the court held that the statute of frauds
barred the imposition of personal liability on the basis of an oral promise
by the defendant to pay a corporate obligation. 132 While in similar cases
the judicially created "main purpose" exception to the statute may permit
enforcement despite the absencd of a writing, 133 nothing in Keith indicated
any direct benefit to the defendant, a conclusion that the court phrased in
terms of "absence of consideration." 134 In asserting the piercing the corpo-
rate veil argument, the plaintiff showed only that the defendant was an
officer and owner of the corporation, that the payroll checks contained the
name "Keith Insulators Company, Inc.," that the business cards used by
salesmen had the defendant's initial ("K") printed on them, and that the
defendant remained an officer despite several changes of the corporate
127. 614 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ).
128. Id. at 172.
129. 603 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1980).
130. 614 S.W.2d at 170-71 (citing Torregrossa v. Szelc, 603 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Tex. 1980)).
Consistent with this analysis are: Preston Farm & Ranch Supply, Inc. v. Biozyme Enter-
prises, 615 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ); Urban v. First State Bank,
609 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ). But see United States v. Thomas,
515 F. Supp. 1351 (W.D. Tex. 1981), where the court, as an alternative ground of decision,
pierced the corporate veil in part because of a failure to follow corporate formalities. Id at
1357. An important element justifying personal liability, however, was that assets of the
corporation were used to benefit the sole shareholder before satisfaction of corporate debts.
ld
131. 616 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
132. Id. at 377; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
133. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 11, § 588.
134. 616 S.W.2d at 377.
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name. These facts clearly seem insufficient to hold the defendant person-
ally liable on an "alter ego" theory.
The second case, Dunn v. Growers Seed Association 135 involved the sale
of a large amount of seed to a Haitian corporation, eighty percent of the
stock of which was owned by the individual defendant. When the account
was not paid, plaintiff brought suit on the twin theories of piercing the
corporate veil and personal guarantee. The first theory failed because the
facts made it abundantly clear that the plaintiff intended to deal with the
corporation so there was no confusion of roles.' 36 Moreover, the evidence
failed to show that the defendant had stripped the corporation of its as-
sets.' 37 Although the defendant made one payment of a corporate debt
with his personal check that later was reimbursed by the corporation, the
court held that this isolated transaction did not constitute sufficient inter-
mingling of assets to justify ignoring the separate existence of the corpora-
tion.1 38 The written guarantee of payment issue arose because such a
guarantee had been demanded by the plaintiff when required payments
had not been forthcoming. The corporation responded, "WE WILL
GUARANTEE PAYMENT AS PROMISED," in a telegram signed by
the corporate general manager, who was not the defendant, and the de-
fendant himself had wired, "YOUR ACCOUNT IN LINE TO BE PAID
IN FULL AT CLOSING" of a contemplated sale of the plantation. 39
The court, however, held that these sketchy writings did not meet the
memorandum requirements of the Texas statute of frauds' 40 because they
did not contain all of he essential elements of the agreement.' 4 1
In Lane v. Dickinson State Bank 42 an employee attempted to assert a
piercing the corporate veil argument to hold a nonshareholder bank and
its president liable for injuring the corporation and rendering it unable to
perform its contract with the plaintiff. The bank and its president had
exercised control over the operations of the corporation when its financial
condition declined, and Lane contended that the bank and the corporation
therefore should be treated as one entity. The court concluded that this
was the wrong theory to hold a third person liable for injuring the corpora-
tion. 43 More plausible theories would be intentional interference with
contractual relations, if the conduct was directed against the plaintiff, or
involuntary bankruptcy, or insolvency proceedings, with the trustee suing
135. 620 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
136. Id. at 237.
137. Id.
138. d.
139. Id. at 236.
140. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 26.01(a), 26.01(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
141. 620 S.W.2d at 237-38 (citing Cohen v. McCutchin, 565 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1978)).
The statute requires that "there must be a written memorandum which is complete within
itself in every material detail, and which contains all of the essential elements of the agree-
ment, so that the contract can be ascertained from the writings without resorting to oral
testimony." Id. at 232.
142. 605 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ).
143. Id. at 653.
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the defendants for the benefit of the plaintiff and other corporate creditors
for injury to the corporation.
Finally, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil also may arise periph-
erally in marital property settlements. In Duke v. Duke'44 the trial court
ordered a corporation that was wholly owned by one spouse to execute a
security agreement securing the payment of a promissory note to the other
spouse. The court of appeals held that the order was improper because the
corporation was not a party to the proceeding and under the facts could
not be considered an alter ego of the shareholder-spouse. 45 In Vallone v.
Vallone 146 the court similarly refused to treat the husband's corporation as
his alter ego for purposes of distinguishing the spouses' community and
separate property. 47
C Partnerships and Limited Partnershps
Texas law traditionally has considered a partnership to be an aggregate
of individuals rather than an entity in its own right.' 48 With the enactment
of the Texas version of the Uniform Partnership Act (TUPA) 14 9 and its
numerous entity oriented provisions, 150 however, this earlier characteriza-
tion gradually has given way in judicial decisions to an entity analysis.
During the survey period the Texas Supreme Court continued this trend
by upholding a Beaumont court decision that a partnership should be con-
sidered an "association" for venue purposes under subdivision 23 of article
1995.151 Therefore, in a suit against the partnership, the court stated that
venue was proper in the county in which the cause of action arose.' 52 The
court expressly disapproved two cases, which had been decided prior to
enactment of the TUPA, that held a partnership not to be an association
for purposes of the venue statue.' 53 In Volpe v. Schlobohm the court reaf-
firmed the principle that a partnership agreement, like any other contract,
can be rescinded for mutual mistake of assumptions if "it is possible to
144. 605 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ dism'd).
145. Id. at 412.
146. 618 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ granted).
147. Id. at 824.
148. The classic statement to this effect appears in Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 637,
639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ refd). "A partnership is not a legal entity. The
law recogizes no personality in a partnership other than that of the partners who compose
it." Id. at 639.
149. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1982).
150. See Bromberg, Source and Comments, 17 TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. 299, 300
(Vernon 1970). Professor Bromberg, after analyzing the TUPA, concluded that "the great
preponderance of the Texas Act favors the entity theory." Id. at 301. So long as the entity
theory is not pursued to the extreme of rejecting personal liability for partners, its applica-
tion may avoid complications that normally attach to the treatment of a partnership as an
aggregate of individual partners, particularly in the areas of property ownership and credi-
tor's rights. See id. at 300.
151. Haney v. Finley, Bate, Deaton & Porter, 618 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Tex. 1981) (per
curiam); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(23) (Vernon 1964).
152. 618 S.W.2d at 542.
153. Id. (citing Heid Bros. v. Mueller-Huber Grain Co., 185 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1944, no writ)); Bubble Up Bottling Co. v. Lewis, 163 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1942, no writ).
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restore the contracting parties to their original positions, and provided the
rights of innocent third parties have not otherwise intervened."'' 54 The ba-
sis for recission in Vo/e was a misunderstanding as to whether certain
Pepperidge Farms franchises were to be contributed to the partnership or
retained as the individual property of the partners. Common law princi-
ples of waiver were applied by the court in a case involving the enforce-
ability of a noncompetition penalty clause in the partnership agreement.
In A/ford, Meroney & Co. v. Rowe the court upheld a jury finding that the
partnership waived its right to exact a penalty from a former partner in
competition with the firm after his withdrawal. 155 Waiver was apparently
implied primarily from a statement by the partner that he would withdraw
only if the penalty were waived (such a waiver had occurred in connection
with at least one earlier withdrawal), followed by a partnership memoran-
dum announcing the withdrawal and estimating that the loss of business
would not be substantial.
One case during the survey period involved the issue of whether part-
nership agreements with third persons bind the partners' actions individu-
ally in connection with nonpartnership property. In City Products Corp. v.
Berman 156 a limited partnership executed a commercial lease containing a
restrictive covenant against leasing space within one thousand feet to a
person who would be in competition with the tenant. Berman, one of the
partners who signed the lease as a general partner, individually owned a
commercial building located across the street from the tenant that he sub-
sequently leased to a competitor. The court held nevertheless that he was
bound by the restrictive covenant which did not involve an illegal
"trust ' 157 in restraint of trade. 158
Another case involved one partner's liability on notes executed by the
second partner on behalf of the partnership. In Womack v. First National
Bank 159 the partnership was engaged in the business of breeding, raising,




The notes were not signed by H. Lane McClanahan, another partner in the
enterprise. The proceeds of the notes were actually used in the pig raising
business. The court upheld a jury verdict that execution of the notes was
154. 614 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
155. 619 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarilo 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
156. 610 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1981).
157. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.04, 15.02(b) (Vernon 1968). The statutes
prohibit any monopoly, trust, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Id. The term "trust" in-
cludes actions by two or more persons to restrict the "free pursuit of a lawful business," to
prevent or lessen competition in the ... sale. . . of tangible personal property," and to
"refrain from engaging in business." Id. § 15.02(b).
158. 610 S.W.2d at 449-50. The court distinguished Schnitzer v. Southwest Shoe Corp.,
364 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1963) in which the antitrust argument was sustained because not all
those who executed the restrictive covenant had an interest in the leased property.
159. 613 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
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within the actual authority of C.C. McClanahan and that such execution
bound the partnership under section 9 of the TUPA. 160 The court rejected
an argument that a finding should have been made that the partnership
was a "trading partnership" before liability was imposed on the basis of
these promissory notes.161 Womack, the administrator of the estate of H.
Lane McClanahan, also argued that the deceased partner was not bound
on some of the notes because the partnership had been dissolved before
these notes were executed. The court correctly held, however, that a previ-
ous partnership creditor such as the plaintiff was not bound by a dissolu-
tion unless he had received actual notice of it. 162
A handful of cases during the survey period involved the fiduciary du-
ties of partners, particularly managing or general partners in a limited
partnership. The Fifth Circuit in Palmer v. Fuqua 163 applied Texas law in
an action by a limited partner alleging that the general partner had
usurped a partnership opportunity and breached his fiduciary duty to the
limited partners. The partnership was engaged in the business of oil and
gas leases and governed by an agreement which stated that "property...
acquired in the area of interest owned by this Partnership shall be offered
first to the Limited Partners." The court found that the general partner
had purchased leases, for his own behalf, located adjacent to certain of the
partnership leases.164 The court, stating that a general partner with exclu-
sive management authority owed a greater duty to the limited partners
than normally was imposed, upheld the imposition of a constructive
trust.165 Accordingly, the court required an accounting for all benefits ob-
tained from the partnership opportunity, and further sustained the imposi-
tion of substantial exemplary damages.
In Crenshaw v. Swenson 166 two limited partners were permitted to re-
cover their capital contributions from the general partner who had en-
gaged in selfdealing. The court found selfdealing by defendant Swenson
from the following actions: conveying the limited partnership's assets to
her corporation; depositing the proceeds of the sale of that property in the
corporate account; permitting the corporation to act as the general contrac-
tor in absolute control of the development of the limited partnership's
property; and personally taking an exclusive real estate brokerage listing
and commission on the sale of the property. 167 The court did not specify
the precise duty that was violated, but observed that these facts showed
"an aura of self-dealing which this court is unable to condone. 168
160. Id. (quoting TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 9 (Vernon 1970)).
161. 613 S.W.2d at 555.
162. Id. at 555-56; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 35(1)(b) (Vernon 1970).
163. 641 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981).
164. Id. at 1155, 1158.
165. Id. at 1158. The court disposed of defendant's argument that a finding of a con-
structive trust must be evidenced by some writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds and the
Texas Trust Act by stating that those statutes were inapplicable. Id. at 1160.
166. 611 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).




Partnership cases sometimes involve issues of contract construction
rather than general legal principles. Wehmeyer v. A. l Marshall & Sons,169
for example, involved a general partnership agreement providing that
"[s]uch salaries to partners shall not be treated as expenses of the partner-
ship in determining net profits or net losses, except by unanimous agree-
ment." 70 The court concluded that the trial court erred in deducting the
active partners' salaries and taxes to determine distributable net profits ab-
sent evidence of an express agreement to that effect.' 71
D. Inspection of Books and Records
Article 2.44 of the TBCA172 is a rather complex statute dealing with
shareholder inspection of corporate books and records. Articles 2.44(B)
and 2.44(C) create a statutory right of inspection for "a holder of record of
shares for at least six (6) months. . . or. . .the holder of record of at least
five percent (5%) of all the outstanding shares," while article 2.44(D) pre-
serves a common law right of inspection for any "beneficial or record
holder of shares."' 73 The major differences between the statutory and
common law rights of inspection are that (1) the burden of showing a
''proper purpose" is on the shareholder under the common law inspection
right but is reversed under the statutory inspection, and (2) a person who is
improperly denied a statutory right of inspection may recover from the
corporation "all costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees," under arti-
cle 2.44(C), while there is no analogous privilege with respect to the com-
mon law right.' 74
Two cases arising during the survey period involved the application (or
misapplication) of this statutory provision. In Fort Worth KJIM, Inc. v.
Walke a person was held to be a "record owner" and, therefore, entitled to
recover his attorneys' fees under article 2.44(C) even though the shares had
been pledged to secure a corporate loan and were registered in the name of
the creditor. 75 Although the corporate records, specifically the documents
relating to the loan, clearly reflected the nature of the pledge of the shares,
it is hard to say that the shareholder was technically a "record owner."' 76
The second case, Chavco Investment Co. v. Pybus, held that while a right to
a jury trial existed when the propriety of the purpose of the shareholder
was controverted, the corporation could rebut an allegation of proper pur-
pose only by alleging specific facts rather than conclusionary allega-
tions.' 77 Otherwise, the court stated, corporations could defeat the
169. 606 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
170. Id. at 734 (emphasis in original).
171. Id.
172. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.44 (Vernon 1980).
173. Id. art. 2.44 (B), (C), (D).
174. Id. art. 2.44(C), (D). See R. HAMILTON, supra note 11, § 804.
175. 604 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
176. In holding that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefits of article 2.44(C), the court
stressed that the corporation knew, and could verify by its own records, that the plaintiff was
the owner of the shares. Id. at 363.
177. 613 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ). The
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shareholders' inspection right by the mere recitation of "magic words." 178
Chavco also presented an issue of first impression in Texas: the rights of
directors, as contrasted with the rights of shareholders, to inspect corporate
books and records. 179 The court, recognizing the management responsibil-
ities of a director, held that a director's inspection rights were absolute
even though he was not accorded such right by statute.' 80 Moreover, in
order to compel inspection, the director could obtain mandamus upon
showing that (1) he was a director, (2) he demanded to inspect corporate
books and records, and (3) inspection was refused.' 8 ' In both of these
cases the court awarded expenses and attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs under
article 2.44(C). Obviously, corporations should be cautious in denying in-
spection right claims for formal or technical reasons.
E Corporate Agents
In Texas a corporation can be held liable for exemplary damages only
for the conduct of an agent who is more than "a mere servant; in other
words, an agent who represents the corporation in such a manner that his
acts are regarded as the acts of the corporation itself."' 182 In one case dur-
ing the survey period the court held that a person in charge of security at a
retail store might be such an agent. 183 The head of security was deemed to
be more than a mere servant because he had authority to direct certain
employees and he was given authority to manage the corporation's entire
security department, and therefore his acts were the store's acts. 184 The
Texas Supreme Court, in another case, reinstated a jury verdict on the
issue of apparent authority of a corporate officer because "more than a
scintilla of evidence" had been presented showing that the officer pos-
sessed apparent authority. 185 The court's conclusion was based on the cor-
poration's establishment of a "chain of communication" by which the
plaintiff dealt exclusively with the officer in question.
The authority of corporate officers, particularly the president, to enter
into transactions on behalf of the corporation continues to give rise to liti-
gation. In Urban v. First State Bank the court held that the president had
court cited Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v. Loughridge, 425 S.W.2d 818 (rex. 1968) as a guide-
line for drafting allegations of fact sufficient to require a jury determination as the the share-
holder's purpose. 613 S.W.2d at 809. The appellant also failed to comply with several other
procedural requirements in seeking a jury trial. Id. at 808-09.
178. 613 S.W.2d at 809.
179. See 19 R. HAMILTON, supra note 11, § 803.
180. 613 S.W.2d at 810.
181. Id.
182. Ledisio Financial Servs., Inc. v. Viracola, 533 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1976, no writ). In addition, a corporation is liable for exemplary damages if it
authorizes or ratifies the malicious act or should have known that the servant would act in a
malicious way. Id.
183. Treasure City v. Strange, 620 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no
writ). The case involved a customer's charge of unlawful detainer by the security guard.
184. d. at 814. See Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 120, 70 S.W.2d 397
(1934).
185. Elliott v. Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 611 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. 1981).
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parol authority from the board of directors to execute a corporate promis-
sory note.' 86 Although the corporation's bylaws required a board resolu-
tion in order to grant such authority, the court found it significant that they
did not require a written resolution. 87 Accordingly, the president's having
met with the board and having received oral authorization for the transac-
tion was sufficient to bind the corporation.' 88
In a case involving a nonprofit corporation, the Texas Supreme Court
held that corporate funds can be expended by the corporate officers in con-
nection with litigation to which the corporation is a party. 89 The court
stated that the rule obtained even when a derivative suit was brought by
minority shareholders to challenge controversial corporate actions. 19°
Moreover, the court held that such expenditures did not violate an injunc-
tion prohibiting corporate spending of monies for other than the conduct
of ordinary business.'91
F Involuntary Dissolution
Several cases arising during the survey period involved the statutory provi-
sions authorizing involuntary forfeiture of a corporation's charter for non-
payment of state franchise taxes and the corresponding right of the
corporation to obtain reinstatement by the payment of all arrearages. 92
Until reinstatement the Texas courts are closed to affirmative suits by a
defaulting corporation.' 93 In one case the defendant waited to raise the
issue of the plaintiffs' charter forfeiture until after the period for reinstate-
ment had passed;' 94 this was too much for the court, however, and it held
that the defense had been waived. 195 This result makes considerable sense
because the purpose of the charter forfeiture and reinstatement provisions
is to raise revenue and not to give defendants unjustified windfalls.
An insurance company secured subrogation rights of an insured corpo-
ration that subsequently lost its charter for nonpayment of franchise taxes
186. 609 S.W.2d 857, 858 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Exparte Edman, 609 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. 1980). Statutory law provides a non-
profit corporation with the authority to sue or defend in its corporate name. TEX. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 1396-2.02A(2) (Vernon 1980).
190. 609 S.W.2d at 534.
191. Id.
192. TEX. TAx CODE ANN. §§ 171.251-.258 (Vernon Pam. 1981). The previous codifica-
tion of the Texas taxation code was repealed by 1981 Tex. Gen Laws, ch. 389, § 39(a), at
1785.
193. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.252(1) (Vernon Pam. 1981) provides that a defaulting
corporation "shall be denied the right to sue or defend in a court of this state." However, a
corporation may be sued (and may defend) even though its charter has been forfeited. See,
e.g., R.J. Carter Enterprises, Inc. v. Greenway Bank & Trust Co., 615 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1981, no writ).
194. Bluebonnet Farms, Inc. v. Gibralter Say. Ass'n, 618 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, no writ).
195. Id. at 84. The court additionally held that payment of the corporate franchise taxes
due would relate back and revive rights that the corporation had at institution of the suit.
Id. at 85.
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in Rushing v. International Aviation Underwriters, Inc.19 6 In response to
the defendant's claim that the insurance company thereby was barred from
instituting action, the court held first, that a subrogation claim, like an
assigned claim, was fully transferred when the claim arose and could not
be barred by forfeiture of the insured's charter, and secondly, that barring
the insurer's suit would not further the statutory goal of assuring payment
of the franchise tax.197 Finally, in Farris v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. 198 a
federal district court applied the Texas franchise tax statute under the Erie
doctrine, 199 and dismissed a counterclaim filed by Sambo's Restaurants,
Inc. Sambo's had qualified to transact business in Texas as a foreign cor-
poration in 1969. In 1973 the corporation decided to discontinue its Texas
operations and simply withdrew without paying accrued franchise taxes or
filing required reports. As Texas lawyers know,2°° this practice did not
effectively terminate the withdrawing corporation's relationship with
Texas nor stop the running of franchise tax liabilities even after the charter
was forfeited.201 That is the lesson that Sambo's learned.
G. Registration of Securities Transfers
Earlier cases held that, under some circumstances, the refusal of a cor-
poration to register a transfer of a security might constitute a tortious con-
version of the security.202 In one case decided during the survey period the
court held that a cause of action for conversion had not been established
when the corporation refused to register the transfer because appeals by
the contending parties had not been exhausted. 20 3 The court further found
no indication of a conspiracy between the corporation and one of the
claimants to deny or delay the transfer to the claimant who ultimately suc-
ceeded in securing the transfer.2°4 A claim of fraudulent conversion was
upheld in another case in which the plaintiffs had been assigned shares of
stock but the controlling shareholder refused to register the transfer.205
The controlling shareholder first attempted to negotiate a purchase of the
appellees' interest, and when that failed he dissolved the corporation, giv-
ing notice only to the record owner of the shares.
Section 8.102(a)(1)(B) of the Texas version of the Uniform Commercial
Code defines a "security" to include, among other things, an instrument
that "is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges.' ' 2°6 Under
196. 604 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
197. Id. at 241-42.
198. 498 F. Supp. 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
199. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
200. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 11, § 923.
201. 498 F. Supp. at 147-48.
202. See, e.g., Earthman's, Inc. v. Earthman, 526 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
203. Bohn v. Travelers Indem. Co., 604 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1980, no writ).
204. Id. at 329-30.
205. Rodriguez v. Orgeton, 616 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1981,
no writ).
206. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.102(a)(1)(B) (Tex. U.C.C.) (Vernon 1968).
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similar definitions some courts in other states had held that securities of
closely held corporations subject to buy-sell agreements or similar restric-
tions were not "securities" for purposes of article eight.20 7 Attempting to
avoid this result, the 1977 revision to the official comments to section 8-102
of the Uniform Commercial Code stated explicitly that "[ilnterests such as
the stock of closely-held corporations, although they are not actually
traded upon securities exchanges, are intended to be included within the
definitions of both certificated and uncertificated securities by the inclusion
of interests 'of a type' commonly traded in those markets. '20 8 Although
this statement does not appear in the comments to the Texas Business and
Commerce Code, the court of civil appeals relied upon it in Kenney v.
Porter2o9 in determining that contracts for the sale of closely held shares
must meet the statute of frauds requirements of article eight. 210 The court,
however, recognized that the doctrine of promissory estoppel in appropri-
ate cases might take a transaction out of section 8.319211 but concluded
that on the facts in Kenny (1) that the acts of forbearance or reliance to
justify imposition of the doctrine were insufficient, and (2) that no showing
was made that the defendants orally promised to execute a necessary
writing.2 12
Finally, the court affirmed a reformation of the buy/sell agreement as
follows: "'If the offeree fails to accept said offer within said sixty (60) day
period of time, the dissatisfied partner shall [have the right to]purchase the
stock of the offeree .... , "213 The bracketed words were in the buy/sell
agreement as originally written but were ordered eliminated by the court
as the product of a mutual mistake since they were not reflective of the true
intention of the partners, which was to make the arrangement mandatory
and not optional.21 4 This minor reformation issue presents an obvious les-
son for the draftsman of share transfer restrictions: a world of difference
exists between a mandatory and an optional arrangement; the four little
words "have the right to" encapsulate this critical distinction.
H Issuance of Shares
The Texas Constitution 21 5 and TBCA21 6 make it clear that shares may
not be issued except for the consideration specified by the board of direc-
tors. One case arising during the survey period involved the issuance of
207. See Annot., 11 A.L.R. 4th 1036, 1043-44 (1982).
208. U.C.C. § 2-205, comment 2 (1978 version).
209. 604 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
210. Id. at 301-02; see TEX. Bus. & COM CODE AN. § 8.319 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
211. 604 S.W.2d at 303-04. See Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (rex. 1965). Such
cases typically involve a promise made in order to influence the conduct of the promisee.
212. 604 S.W.2d at 304-05.
213. Id. at 305 (emphasis in original).
214. Id. at 305-06.
215. TEx. CONST. art. XII, § 6 provides that "[n]o corporation shall issue stock... ex-
cept for money paid, labor done or property actually received."
216. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN1. art. 2.16 (Vernon 1980) tracks the language of the state
constitution. Article 2.15 grants authority to the board of directors to fix the share value.
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corporate shares. In War-Pak, Inc. v. Rice2 17 the organizational board
minutes recited that 500,000 shares were acquired by the initial sharehold-
ers for $26,000 cash plus a piece of equipment (a "parker") worth $2,000.
In fact, the two purchasers paid only $500 each. The court held that the
shares were void in their entirety, a conclusion of considerable practical
importance to subsequent investors who had paid one dollar per share for
their shares. 218
I Usury
With the establishment of different usury rules for corporations and in-
dividuals, 219 litigation has arisen regarding the limitation applicable in
transactions involving both a corporation and the individual controlling
shareholders. Clearly, a loan to a corporation that is personally guaran-
teed by the shareholder is treated as a loan to the corporation for purposes
of the usury statute.220 On the other hand, if credit is extended to an indi-
vidual and successively extended to his company after incorporation, the
rate of interest may be usurious as to transactions entered into by the indi-
vidual but not as to those of the corporation. 22'
J. Reservation of Legislative Power
Article 9.12 of the TBCA 222 contains a traditional provision reserving to
the legislature the right to regulate business corporations and preventing
the vesting of property rights from corporate activities. By virtue of this
clause, a corporation incorporated and doing business since 1946 under the
name "Plastic Engineering and Sales Corporation" was required to delete
the word "engineering" from its corporate name because of the enactment
of legislation in 1965 regulating the use of the word "engineering" in cor-
porate names.223
217. 604 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
218. Id. at 503-04.
219. A separate usury statute for corporations, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-
2.09 (Vernon 1980), allows a corporation to agree to pay up to 1P percent per month on
borrowings in excess of $5,000. In 1981, alterntive interest ceilings were adopted. Corpora-
tions now may agree to a rate of interest that does not exceed (1) twice the bank discount
auction average rate for 26-week United States treasury bills or (2) the annualized or quar-
terly ceilings published by the Consumer Credit Commissioner. Id. art. 5069-1.04 (Vernon
Pam. Supp. 1971-1981). The statute provides, however, that this ceiling may not drop below
18 percent nor exceed 24 percent. Id. art. 5069-1.04(b)(1). If the loan is for business, com-
mercial, investment, or similar purposes and exceeds $250,000, the ceiling may rise to 28
percent. Id. art. 5069-1.04(b)(2).
220. R.J. Carter Enterprises, Inc. v. Greenway Bank & Trust, 615 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ). As a general rule, the guarantor of a debt
cannot avail himself of the defense of usury. Id See also Shook v. Republic National Bank,
627 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
221. Preston Farm & Ranch Supply, Inc. v. Bio-Zyme Enterprises, 615 S.W.2d 258 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ) (credit charge of 12% per annum was usurious only as to
the individual).
222. Tax. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 9.12(A) (Vernon 1980).
223. Kilpatrick v. State Bd. of Registration of Professional Eng'r, 610 S.W.2d 867, 871
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ refd n.r.e.). The statute proscribes the use of any
form of "engineer" in a corporate name unless the corporation actually engages in engineer-
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K Enjoining Filing of Certificates of Dissolution
In Beall v. Strake224 a judgment creditor seized certificates representing
shares of stock in an effort to satisfy his judgment. Upon learning that the
shares would become worthless prior to an execution sale, the creditor at-
tempted to enjoin a voluntary dissolution that he feared would result in the
dispersal of corporate assets and loss of value of the seized shares. The
creditor sued the corporation and its shareholders, including the debtor, in
Brazos County and also brought a separate lawsuit in Austin to enjoin the
secretary of state from issuing a certificate of dissolution.225 The latter suit
was dismissed on the grounds that the issuance of a certificate of dissolu-
tion was purely ministerial. 226 Furthermore, the court stated that all issues
should be resolved by the litigation in Brazos County, although the secre-
tary of state was not a party.227
L. Statutory Bookkeeping Requirement
Article 2.44(A) of the TBCA requires each corporation to "keep correct
and complete books and records of account and . minutes of the pro-
ceedings of its shareholders and board of directors. '228 The Texas Non-
profit Corporation Act contains essentially the same requirement. 229 One
case arising during the survey period involved the claim that an involun-
tary termination of employment was invalid because of the failure to rec-
ord the action in the corporate minutes as required by the Texas Nonprofit
Corporation Act. 230 The court rejected this contention on the ground that
the minutes were merely written records of acts of the corporation's direc-
tors and the failure to record an action does not necessarily mean that it
was invalid. 231
M Jurisdiction, Venue, and Related Problems
In every survey period a large number of Texas cases deal with proce-
dural issues that relate to corporate litigation. These cases often involve
nothing more than an application of the Texas venue232 or long-arm 233
statutes to the specific facts. Such cases may be important to an attorney
who is seeking to find litigation involving factual patterns similar to his
ing activities through a registered engineer. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 327 1a, § 18
(Vernon 1968).
224. 609 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
225. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 6.02 (Vernon 1980) permits voluntary dissolution
by consent of all the shareholders. The creditor sought to enjoin the filing on the ground
that he was a shareholder and had not consented to the dissolution.
226. 609 S.W.2d at 887.
227. Id. at 887-88.
228. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44(A) (Vernon 1980).
229. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-2.23 (Vernon 1980).
230. Cameron & Willacy Counties Community Projects, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 614 S.W.2d
585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
231. Id. at 589.
232. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
233. Id. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
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case, but venue cases applied to specific facts usually are not of general
interest. The brief discussion following deals with the few cases involving
more general principles.
Scope of Long Arm Jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme Court has stated that
the Texas long-arm statute reaches the limits permitted by due process.
234
The Fifth Circuit, however, has construed the Texas statute so as not to
reach torts committed outside Texas by nonresident defendants who have
sufficient contacts with the state to be amenable to suit in this state. 235 The
court construed literally the language of the Texas statute as covering only
actions "arising out of' contacts within the State; this construction, the
court suggested, was so firmly rooted in the language of section 2031 b that
legislative amendment was required if this construction is to be
changed.236
A foreign corporation that guarantees the payment of an indebtedness
payable in Texas is subject to the jurisdiction of Texas courts under the
long-arm statute.237 Much litigation involving defects in service of process
arises from attacks on default judgments. Texas courts have traditionally
been generous in setting aside such judgments for defects in service of pro-
cess.238 For example, in Texas Inspection Services, Inc. v. Melville, a de-
fault judgment was set aside because the secretary of state, in compliance
with the statutory mandate to forward the process "by registered mail, ad-
dressed to the corporation at its registered office," had mailed it to "2525
Marilee" rather than "2526 Marilee," the corporation's actual registered
office. 239 The court rejected the argument that service was complete when
it was made upon the secretary of state, holding rather that service could
be effected only upon strict compliance with all statutory requirements,
including the mailing of the process to the correct address of the registered
office of the corporation. 240 In a similar case a default judgment based on
service on the secretary of state was set aside because the transcript did not
show or recite any attempt to serve process on the registered agent of the
corporation. 24'
234. See U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
235. Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981).
236. Id. at 1266 n.7.
237. LaQuinta Motor Inns, Inc. v. Schmelig Constr. Co., 617 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
38. Charles Cohen, Inc. v. Adams, 516 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App-Tyler 1974, no
writ); Crawford v. Brown, 507 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, no writ); Han-
over Modular Homes of Taft, Inc. v. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust, 476 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1972, no writ); Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co. v. Alley, 378 S.W.2d
129 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Pete Singh, Inc. v. Macias,
608 S.W.2d 822, 822-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ) (process issued to Fernando
Singh was service on putative agent personally but not on Pete Singh Produce, Inc.).
239. 616 S.W.2d 253, 254-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ). See
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.1IA (Vernon 1980).
240. 616 S.W.2d at 254.
241. Thomas Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Rulon Elec. Co., 609 S.W.2d 890, 891-92 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.). The court noted that had the record
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Certain defects in the citation, however, will not render service of pro-
cess void. In He/fman Motors, Inc. v. Stockman242 service was directed to
be made on the corporation's registered agent, "William A. Helfman."
The sheriffs return recited that delivery was made to "William Helfman
(Registered for serve in person)." This recitation, despite its obvious defi-
ciencies, was held to be sufficient to support a default judgment.243
Venue. Most venue cases involve routine application of the statute to the
specific facts. One case of somewhat broader interest held that a foreign
corporation that is not qualified to transact business in Texas has no venue
privilege under the Texas statutes and can be sued in any county in
Texas. 244 Another case held that the plaintiff may be a representative of
the defendant in order to establish venue under the exception that the de-
fendant have "agency or representative" in the county.
245
N. Securities Regulation
Application of Securities Acts to Real Estate Ventures. Several of the cases
arising during the survey period involve the issue whether an interest in a
real estate venture constitutes a "security" for purposes of the federal2 46 or
state247 securities acts. The broad test for this issue has been clearly estab-
lished at least since the famous Howey2 48 decision established the basic
requirements of an investment contract. There must be (1) an investment,
(2) in a common enterprise, (3) on an expectation of profit solely to be
derived from the efforts of others. However, the application of this test to
real estate ventures has given rise to considerable litigation.
In general, a limited partnership interest is a security under both state
and federal law249 unless the limited partner is also a general partner and
therefore possesses a power of management. Frazier v. Manson
250 in-
volved a suit between two active general partners engaged in real estate
development through limited partnerships. Plaintiff Frazier attempted to
sue the other general partner in federal court alleging improper sale of
shown an unsuccessful attempt to serve the agent using reasonable diligence, service on the
secretary of state would have been effective. Id.
242. 616 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
243. Id. at 396.
244. Central & S. Freight Lines, Inc. v. Hatley, 614 S.W.2d 864, 886-87 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
245. Beef Cattle Co. v. Scott, 613 S.W.2d 318, 321-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981,
no writ). The case also discussed in some detail what was needed for a person to be an
"agency or representative." Id. at 322-23. The court was construing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 1995(23) (Vernon 1964).
246. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 78c(a)(10) (1976). The cited sections refer to the security require-
ment and the definitional provisions.
247. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 4 (Vernon 1980).
248. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
249. See Mayfield v. Troutman, 613 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref d
n.r.e.) (relying on federal precedents). See also Westchester Corp. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitch-
ell & Co., 626 F.2d 1212, 1217 (5th Cir. 1980) (commenting that the Texas courts "have
engrafted the federal decisional law onto the state definition").
250. 651 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1981).
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limited partnership interests on the theory that he had acquired a "secur-
ity" in the form of certain limited partnership interests. The court held
that because Frazier was involved in the management of the limited part-
nerships, those partnerships were not securities as to him.25' The court
recognized, however, that true limited partners might have had rights
under the federal securities acts that the general partners by virtue of their
power of management and control did not have.2 52
If the interest is a joint venture, general partnership, or similar interest,
it may or may not be a security depending on the circumstances. For there
to be a "security" there must be a commonality in the investment in the
sense that the fortunes of the investors are dependent on the efforts of
those seeking the investment. 253 If, however, the investor has power to
participate in management, the interest he has acquired is not a security
even if he is in fact inactive and relies entirely on the managers of the
enterprise. 254 On the other hand, if the arrangement is structured so that
he has no power of management the investment he makes may be a
security.
Statute of Limitations in Rule lOb-5 Actions in Texas. In Wood v. Combus-
tion Engineering, Inc.,255 a panel of the Fifth Circuit resolved the continu-
ing controversy over the appropriate Texas statute of limitations to be
applied to rule 1Ob-5 actions in favor of the general two-year Texas fraud
statute256 rather than the three-year statute of the Texas Securities Act.257
This choice, on which several district courts had disagreed, was based in
part on the effect of a recent Supreme Court decision on the scope of rule
lOb-5 requiring scienter as an essential element of that cause of action. 258
The court thought the scienter requirement made rule 1Ob-5 more analo-
gous to the Texas fraud statute requiring scienter and reliance than the
more relaxed standards for a cause of action under the Texas Securities
Act.
2 5 9
Other Rule 10b-3 Litigation. In another securities fraud case a whole range
of issues relating to rule lOb-5 were decided. 260 The court first held that
suit could be based on section 10(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, 261 even though the same
251. Id. at 1080.
252. Id. at 1081.
253. Id. at 1080.
254. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396, 70 L.
Ed.2d 212 (1981).
255. 643 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981).
256. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1980).
257. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 33(H) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
258. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
259. 643 F.2d at 344-45.
260. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102
S. Ct. 1766, 72 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1982).
261. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1976). See 17 C.F.R.§ 240.10b-5 (1981).
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conduct also was actionable under section 12(2)262 of the Securities Act of
1933.263 This issue has been specifically reserved by the United States
Supreme Court in two significant rule lOb-5 cases.264 Recent decisions in
other courts of appeal, however, agree with the result reached by the Fifth
Circuit that the claims are not identical under the two statutes, and the rule
1Ob-5 claim therefore does not make moot the specific limitations applica-
ble to actions under the 1933 Act. 2
65
The court also outlined the elements necessary to establish the rule lOb-
5 action for fraud: (a) misstatement or omission, (b) materiality,
(c) scienter, which according to the court may be shown by recklessness, 266
(d) reliance, and (e) causation.267 The court then considered the measure
of damages for such actions under rule lOb-5, rejecting damages based on
"recission" when the parties were not in privity of contract in favor of an
"out of pocket" rule.2 6 8 Finally, the court decided that contribution
among defendants in rule lOb-5 cases is permissible despite the general
rule of in pari delicto,269 and that attorneys' fees should generally not be
awarded in the absence of bad faith.270
The rights of debenture holders are essentially a matter of contract law.
The "contract" is the indenture, typically a lengthy and complex fine print
document primarily of interest to attorneys. These documents, however,
are critical in establishing the rights of securities holders and their "plain
language" is unlikely to be augmented or supplemented by courts. This is
graphically demonstrated by the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Broad v.
Rockwell International Corp. in which the court discussed at considerable
length the conversion rights of convertible debentures following a merger
of the issuer.2
71
While the court stated that it was deciding the case "on far narrower
grounds" than the panel opinion, and that it was mak[ing] no new law
under Rule lob-5 today, but merely apply[ing] well settled principles to
the facts of this case," 272 the opinion does firmly commit the Fifth Circuit
to the view that that "severe recklessness" was a substitute for "scien-
ter."' 273 The Court stated:
262. 15 U.S.C § 77a (1976).
263. 640 F.2d at 543.
264. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 n.15 (1975); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 n.31 (1976).
265. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946
(1980); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999
(D.D.C. 1978).
266. 640 F.2d at 545. The Fifth Circuit's per curiam opinion on this issue confirms this
result in Broad v. Rockwell International Corp., 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1981). See G.A.
Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1981) (U.S. appeal pending).
267. 640 F.2d at 543.
268. Id. at 554-55.
269. Id. at 559.
270. Id. at 559-60.
271. 642 F.2d 929, 940-57 (5th Cir. 1981).
272. Id. at 960.
273. Id. at 961. Cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1979).
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Severe recklessness is limited to those highly unreasonable omissions
or misrepresentations that involve not merely simple or even inexcus-
able negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordi-
nary care, and that present a danger of misleading buyers or sellers
which is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the de-
fendant must have been aware of it.274
The court found little more than simple negligence, and certainly not se-
vere recklessness. 275
Churning. Most litigation involving "churning," that is, excessive trading
by securities dealers in discretionary accounts in order to generate commis-
sions, 276 has arisen in other circuits. Indeed, the first Fifth Circuit churn-
ing case, Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co ,277 was decided during the survey
period. This opinion recognized churning as a violation of both the fed-
eral securities law278 and the Texas imposed common law fiduciary duty of
brokers. This opinion also resolved in a reasonable way several other sig-
nificant substantive issues, including the liability of the broker for both
refund of excessive commissions and declines in market value of the plain-
tiff's portfolio, the availability of arbitration as to the state law claims, and
the appropriateness and reasonableness of punitive damages for churning
violations.279 Furthermore, the court determined that a rule-of-thumb
award of punitive damages for churning violations to the extent of three
times the compensatory damages was not excessive. 280
Liability of Attorneys for Securities Act Violations. In Junker v. Crory, a
Louisiana case brought in the Fifth Circuit, the court imposed liability on
an attorney under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.28 1 This sec-
tion imposes liability on a person who offers or sells a security on the basis
of a false or misleading statement to a purchaser. Earlier cases had estab-
lished that a person who was a "motivating force" in the sale might be
liable under section 12(2).282 In evaluating the role of attorneys in connec-
tion with securities sales, the court distinguished the situation in Croy v.
Campbell,283 in which a court held that an attorney who had only given
tax advice in connection with the transaction was not a "seller. ' 284 In con-
trast, the attorney in Junker had initially suggested the transaction, urged
274. 642 F.2d at 961-62.
275. Id. at 962.
276. Churning is a violation of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities acts. See,
e.g., Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1980).
277. 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
278. This is a duty encompassed within the broad umbrella of rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.§ 240.10b-5 (1981).
279. 637 F.2d at 328-32.
280. Id. at 331.
281. 650 F.2d 1349, 1362 (5th Cir. 1981); 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
282. See, e.g., Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 693 (5th
Cir. 1971). See also Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. Colo. 1965); Len-
nerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
283. 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980).
284. 650 F.2d at 714.
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its approval at the shareholders' meeting, and prepared the necessary doc-
uments to effect the transaction. He was, according to the court, a "key
participant" and "active negotiator," not a "passive advisor. ' 285 Another
Fifth Circuit decision rejected a similar definition of "seller" under the
Texas Securities Act and suggested that "seller" should be limited to those
actively engaged in the sales process, not including those who merely par-
ticipate in preparing an offering. 286
Texas Securities Act Litigation. In the single reported criminal proceeding
involving the Texas Securities Act287 a conviction for the sale of unregis-
tered securities was upheld against the contention that the phrase, "public
solicitation," was unconstitutionally vague. 288 The court approved an in-
struction that a solicitation could be "public" even though it was not made
to the whole world.289 In the only noteworthy civil case involving an in-
junction against violations of the Act, the court upheld the appointment of
a receiver with broad powers under section 581-25-1 of the Act.290 The
court reviewed carefully the statutory requirements for the appointment of
a receiver and concluded that the facts justified the action. 29'
285. Id. at 1360.
286. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766, 72 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1982).
287. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1 to 581-39 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
288. Koah v. State, 604 S.W.2d 156, 161-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
289. Id. at 162.
290. Kirk v. State, 611 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ). See TEX.
REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-25-1 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
291. 611 S.W.2d at 150-51.
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